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Introduction
The international relations (IR) literature has long recognized that many of its key variables
are relational in nature. While research has traditionally focused on the dyadic nature of
states’ decisions, increasing attention has been paid to how actors’ locations within the
global system shape their choices. Most recently, scholars have begun to recast traditional
IR variables – such as conflict, trade, alliances, or IO memberships – as networks connecting
international states. Properties of these networks (e.g., density, polarization), and of actor
positions within them (e.g., centrality, similarity), may then reveal important insights about
international events (e.g., Cranmer, Desmarais and Menninga 2012; Maoz 2010; Maoz et al.
2006; Ward, Hoff and Lofdhall 2003). Previous work also recognized the importance of such
positional and relational information, as in Signorino and Ritter’s (2002) development of S
scores to capture “political affinity” between states. As a result, identifying the relevant
properties of international networks and exploring their effects constitutes a large part of
research within IR.1
There are two general approaches to the construction and use of network measures:
measure-oriented and estimation-oriented. The measure-oriented approach consists of iden-
tifying the measure of interest (e.g., centrality, similarity), using the relevant formula to
compute the measure, and proceeding to use the resulting measure as a right-hand side vari-
able in a regression. Maoz et al. (2006), for example, employ this approach to demonstrate
that similarities among international states’ positions within the international trade network
help explain the occurrence of international conflict. The estimation-oriented approach is
theoretically similar, yet more methodologically complex. This approach emphasizes the
non-independence among actors (or nodes) and their relationships (or edges) within a net-
work: for example, if actor A has a direct tie to actor B, and actor B has a direct ties to
1We use the term network in a general sense here to capture studies and variables that consider relative
location in any system, whether explicitly treated as a network or not.
2
actor C, then, by construction, actors A and C have an indirect tie between them. These
types of network configurations—network configurations that are likely to arise simply by
construction—are referred to as “endogenous” network properties. The proponents of the es-
timation approach maintain that, given a network structure, one cannot properly isolate the
effects of the independent variables without properly accounting for the network properties
(Cranmer and Desmarais 2011).
Both approaches provide great leverage in exploring the connection between actors’ po-
sitions within networks and actor behavior while accounting for properties endogenous to
the network. There exists, however, a different source of network endogeneity that has so
far received little attention—endogeneity that may arise as a result of using measures of one
feature of the international system to explain another feature. Treating network measures as
exogenous to actor behavior, as commonly practiced by the proponents of both approaches,
may produce biased estimates if actor positions within networks are in fact endogenous to
(not independent of) actor behavior. We examine the use of network measures — such as
S scores, structural equivalence (SEq) scores, and degree centrality — as exogenous inde-
pendent variables when the underlying relational variables used to generate those measures
exhibit endogeneity. While the issue of endogeneity has long been recognized in the study of
IR (Hegre, Oneal and Russett 2010; Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny 2004; Reuveny and Kang
1996), it has not yet become salient among studies using network measures.2
For example, what are the implications of including the alliance-based S score in an
equation that predicts trade or conflict? As evident from the debate regarding whether al-
liances lead to more conflict (Lai and Reiter 2000; Vasquez 2009), there may be an overlap
between the factors that contribute to conflict initiation and those related to alliance for-
mation. Mathematically, the presence of such an overlap may express itself as a correlation
2See Rogowski and Sinclair (2012) as an example of addressing network endogeneity within the framework
of legislative studies.
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between unobserved factors explaining alliances and the conflict outcome—an issue known
as endogeneity. This endogeneity may be further exacerbated by using the offending variable
to construct a measure of network position similarity, such as S or SEq scores that will then
be used to predict an outcome that is endogenous to it. Similar examples may be found
in other areas of study, such the use of trade-based SEq scores to predict conflict, despite
the possible endogeneity between conflict and trade. These measures find uses beyond IR,
of course, as scholars of American politics have taken similar approaches to examining the
influence of Congressional networks on members’ voting patterns (Rogowski and Sinclair
2012) or success in passing legislation and amendments (Fowler 2006).
We suggest two alternative instrumental variable (IV) approaches for addressing possible
endogeneity when employing network based measures as regressors in subsequent analyses.
The first approach—the Instrumented Network—is to instrument the network itself (i.e., the
associated relational variable, such as trade) and then use this instrument to construct the
relevant network measure to be used as a regressor. The second approach—Instrumented
Score—retains the network as given and instead generates an instrument of the relevant net-
work score (e.g., instrument trade SEq score), then use the instrumented score as a regressor.
While applying nonlinear functions to possible endogenous variables generally calls for the
second approach (Kelejian 1971), we find that this may not be true for network measures.
First, network measures are a special type of nonlinear functions, in which the value for
actor i often depends not just on i’s own realization of the variable, but also on the real-
ization of the variable for many, if not all, other actors. Second, network measures usually
involve complex functions of the endogenous relational variable that make it hard to identify
the correct polynomial from which to directly generate an IV of the measure. We supple-
ment our theoretical argument with Monte Carlo analysis and empirical demonstrations that
model (a) the relationship between international trade and conflict networks, (b) inter-state
alliances and international trade, and (c) preferential trade agreements (PTA) and economic
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sanctions, using both na¨ıve and a two-stage instrumental variables estimators within the
context of standard logit estimators as well using exponential-family random graph models
(ERGMs).
Our results indicate, first, that one should almost never ignore the endogeneity problem
since doing so can result in severely biased estimates. Comparing our two corrections, we
find that, while the Instrumented Score approach produces slightly biased estimates, the
Instrumented Network approach produces sufficient gains in precision to be strongly preferred
in root mean square error terms. Further, in some cases the bias in the former can be
derived and therefore adjusted for. Finally, the choice of the best correction depends on the
network measure at use. We find, for example, that in the presence of moderate to severe
endogeneity, the Instrumented Network approach works best for the use of SEq scores, while
the Instrumented Score approach works best for S scores. For the use of centrality, both
instrumental approaches are equally preferable to the na¨ıve model.
Measures of Network Position
Along with a new approach to theorizing, network-based approaches have also equipped
scholars with a new set of analytical tools that range from new conceptual measures (e.g.,
centrality, structural equivalence, connectedness) to network-oriented approaches to statisti-
cal estimation.3 In the current study, we narrow our analysis to three network measures: (1)
centrality or degree centrality, which is, perhaps, the most commonly used among the net-
work measures (for example, see Dorussen and Ward 2008; Fowler 2006; Hafner-Burton and
Montgomery 2012; Kinne 2012; Murdie and Davis 2012); (2) S scores, which are a common
measure of relational or political similarity, most frequently applied within the IR subfield
(e.g., Bennett and Stam 2004; Hegre, Oneal and Russett 2010; Maoz 2010; Stone 2002); and
3For a general overview of network measures, see Jackson (2008); for examples of their use, see Bonacich
(1987), Fowler (2006), and Maoz (2010); for a practical guide for their calculation, see Miura (2012). For an
overview of network-oriented statistical estimation, see Cranmer and Desmarais (2011).
5
(3) SEq scores, which have been used as a theoretically similar, yet computationally distinct
alternative to S scores (e.g., Snyder and Kick 1979; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2012;
Maoz et al. 2006).
Centrality
The term “network centrality” or “centrality,” for short, refers to a family of network mea-
sures, based on the total (sometimes weighted) number of a node’s direct and indirect con-
nections (Bonacich 1987). In many political science applications, actor centrality is used
as a measure of actor power or prestige within the network.4 Scholars of IR, for example,
use states’ centrality within the IGO network to explain international conflict and economic
sanctions (Dorussen and Ward 2008; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006, 2008, 2012; In-
gram, Robinson and Busch 2005; Ward 2006), or foreign aid allocations (Lin and Shreve
2013). Others have used centrality to explain the effects of international non-governmental
organizations (Carpenter 2011; Lake and Wong 2009; Moore, Eng and Daniel 2003; Murdie
2014). Scholars of American politics, in the meantime, have used centrality to assess the
influence of particular members of Congress (e.g., Fowler 2006).
Following the general trend in the literature, we focus on the measure of degree centrality :
1
|V | − 1
∑
j( 6=i)
Aij, (1)
where V is the set of vertices and A is a |V |x|V | adjacency matrix with Aij entries being
equal to 1 if an edge connects vertices i and j, and 0 otherwise.
4Although see Bonacich (1987) and Padgett and Ansell (1993) for an argument that actors with low
centrality have greater strength within bargaining networks.
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S Scores
Although IR research has offered several alternative measures of political affinity, it is safe to
say that various versions of S scores—a spatial measure of policy similarity—developed by
Signorino and Ritter (2002) still constitute the state of the art.5 The central idea behind the
construction of S scores is that one can proxy states’ preferences by using the information
from their observable (foreign) policy decisions—referred to as “(foreign) policy portfolios”—
on the issues of interest. States with “similar” observable policy decisions will receive similar
affinity scores, while states exhibiting a lot of policy divergence will be located further away
on the affinity spectrum (Signorino and Ritter 2002, p. 126).6
More formally, let P i = [pi1, p
i
2, . . . , p
i
n] represent state i’s policy portfolio on a given
issue. Analogously, state j’s policy portfolio on the same issue can be represented by P j =[
p
j
1, p
j
2, . . . , p
j
n
]
. Since the observable data represents mappings of states’ policy positions,
while the true positions are unobservable, Signorino and Ritter introduce a vector L =
[l1, l2, . . . , ln] of order-preserving scoring rules lk : p
i
k →pk, which map data values p
i
k for
state i’s policy along dimension k to a value on a closed interval pk ≡ [l
min
k , l
max
k ] ⊂ ℜ.
Finally, let W = [w1, w2, . . . , wn] be a vector of weights.
Signorino and Ritter (2002, p. 127) define similarity S of states i and j’s policy portfolios
P i and P j as follows:
S
(
P i, P j,W, L
)
= 1− 2
d (P i, P j,W, L)
dmax (W,L)
, (2)
5According to Scholar Google, since its introduction in 2002, this measure has been used in 368 scholarly
studies.
6See Ha¨ge (2011) for a proposed improvement upon S scores, which allows to account for chance commit-
ments. Also, see Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten (2013) for an alternative ideal points approach to measuring
policy similarity.
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where
d
(
P i, P j ,W, L
)
=
n∑
k=1
wk
∆maxk
∣∣lk (pik)− lk (pjk)∣∣, (3)
and
dmax (W,L) = max︸︷︷︸
Xi,Xj
d
(
X i, Xj ,W, L
)
=
n∑
k=1
wk
∆maxk
(
lmaxk − l
min
k
)
=
n∑
k=1
wk. (4)
Structural Equivalence Scores
Political scientists’ interest in network analysis has also led to the adoption of several al-
ternative measures of relational similarity from sociology. Most prominently, scholars have
used the family of measures, knows as the structural equivalence scores (SEq) (for early uses
in sociology, see Boorman and White 1976; Burt 1976; Sailer 1979). SEq scores is an dyadic
measure that captures similarity of network ties between any given actors (nodes) i and j in
relation to all other actors (nodes) k in the network. The early applications of SEq scores
within the study of IR date back to Brams (1966) and Snyder and Kick (1979), while more
recent research includes Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery (2009); Hafner-Burton and
Montgomery (2012) and Maoz et al. (2006). The particular type of SEq scores, on which we
focus in this paper is the one used by Maoz et al. (2006) and calculated as:7
SEqij =
n∑
k=1
(xik − x•i) (xjk − x•j) +
n∑
k=1
(xki − xi•) (xkj − xj•)√
n∑
k=1
(xik − x•i)
2 +
n∑
k=1
(xki − xi•)
2
√
n∑
k=1
(xjk − x•j)
2 +
n∑
k=1
(xkj − xj•)
2
, (5)
where x•i,x•j are the respective means of i and j’s exports to every other actor k (row
means of the relational matrix X), and xi•,xi• are the means of the tie strength between
7For alternative SEq scores’ formulas, including the one based on the Hamming or absolute value metric,
see Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery (2009) and Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2012).
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k’s and i or j (column means) (Maoz et al. 2006, 674). Note that the first term in the
numerator represents the covariance of rows i and j and the second term represents the
column covariance while the first term in the denominator represents the sum of the row
and column variances for i and the second the same quantity for j. Applying this formula to
the network of international exports, (Maoz et al. 2006) argue that the SEq measure gives a
sense of the similarity, along the lines of a correlation, of two countries’ outflows and inflows
of trade with all other states. In fact, if X is a symmetric matrix, SEqij is the correlation
between Xik and Xjk.
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Endogeneity of Network Position Measures
Our central argument is that a study of relational variables’ effects is inseparable from
the study of network formation. Much like social networks, networks of states rarely form
at random—an implicit assumption of using a network measure as an exogenous indepen-
dent variable in a regression. Instead, both social and international networks emerge in
response to two general types of causal effects: homophily—self-selection based on pre-
existing similarities—and common exposure (Franzese, Hays and Kachi 2012; Hays, Kachi
and Franzese 2010). The difference between these effects is theoretically important: a the-
ory that posits homophily as the causal mechanism behind a network effect must rule out
common exposure, and vice versa. Endogeneity of the independent variable can be thought
of as a special type of common exposure, whose effect, if present, is especially detrimental
for recovering unbiased estimates.
The literature on alliance formation, for example, has shown that the choice of allies
may be driven by short- and long-term security prospects (e.g. Morrow 1991), domestic
“guns vs. butter” trade-offs (Kadera and Morey 2008; Powell 1993), as well as state identity
8Maoz et al.s (2006) use of SEq scores as a measure of affinity is not the only way, in which SEq scores
have been applied; many scholars use the SEq as a waypoint to partitioning the system into clusters (Hafner-
Burton, Kahler and Montgomery 2009).
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considerations such as regime type (e.g., Lai and Reiter 2000). These insights, however,
are rarely linked to the studies that focus on alliances or related measures (e.g., alliance
portfolio similarity) as an independent variable. In the meantime, taking advantage of the
insights provided by the alliance formation literature would improve the statistical estimates
of alliance effects on such variables as conflict or domestic military spending. In the view of
possible endogeneity between alliances and conflict or domestic military spending, estimates
would be even further improved by simultaneous or two-stage estimation. Analogously, the
trade literature has long pointed to conflict as one of the impediments to the growth and
stability of inter-state commercial ties (e.g. Hegre, Oneal and Russett 2010; Keshk, Pollins
and Reuveny 2004; Reuveny and Kang 1996; Russett and Oneal 2001). A model of a trade
network’s effect on conflict could possibly produce more accurate estimates if it accounted
for possible endogeneity.
This is not to say, however, that the literature has ignored endogeneity altogether. A
number of studies have recognized the issue and attempted to test for it by running “reverse
causality” checks or lagging the independent variable (e.g., Maoz 2010; Pevehouse 2002a,b,
2005). Whether such corrections are sufficient, however, depends on the type and extent
of endogeneity (Engle, Hendry and Richard 1983; Granato 1991). Addressing endogeneity
using temporal lags or “reverse causality” may be problematic for several reasons. First, it
assumes that a researcher is able to specify the correct lag structure. It is often theoretically
unclear how many lags are sufficient to strip the model of endogeneity and defaulting to
a one-year lag—the most common fix in the literature—may not be the best solution.9
Second, temporal lags are altogether irrelevant in the presence of feedback loops between
the independent and the dependent variables (Engle, Hendry and Richard 1983; Granato
1991).
9Although tests for alternative lag structures exist, the choice of lag structures is rarely justified with
references to these tests (Wilson and Butler 2007, 106-107).
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The issue of network endogeneity has been long recognized (Manski 1993). Sociological
research, for example, has pointed out the endogeneity between friendship networks and sub-
stance abuse (e.g., Snijders, Steglich and Schweinberger 2007; Steglich, Snijders and Pearson
2010). Taking advantage of the House office lottery, Rogowski and Sinclair (2012) conduct
an empirical test for an endogenous relationship between congressional office proximity, roll
call behavior and cosponsorship decisions. Within the study of IR, Chyzh (2013) models
endogeneity between trade network formation and its effect on domestic rule of law using a
game-theoretic approach. The bottom line is that the presence of endogeneity remains an
empirical issue that is only partially solved by a purely theoretical solution.
IV Approaches for Endogeneity in Network Measures
Social scientists have long known that the presence of endogeneity leads to biased estimates.
The primary methodological tool of correcting and accounting for endogeneity in social
sciences is the use of IV two-stage estimators, such as two-stage least squares (Gawande and
Li 2009; Greene 2000). The main idea is that endogeneity is stripped from the “offending”
regressors by substituting a set of “instruments”—exogenous variables that are correlated
with possibly endogenous regressors, yet not affected by the dependent variable.
In its simplest form, endogeneity is defined in the following way. Let us start we the
model
Y = Xβ + ǫ, (6)
where Y is the dependent variable, X is the independent variable, β is the coefficient on X,
and ǫ represents the error term. To say that X is an endogenous regressor simply means
that there is a non-zero correlation between X and ǫ. As a result, a random shock to the
dependent variable Y leads to a change in X. In order to identify β, we substitute the
11
endogenous regressor X with a set of exogenous regressors Z that predict it:
X = Zγ + υ, (7)
where Z is uncorrelated with the error terms υ and ǫ, which makes it exogenous to the
model.
In our context we need a little more structure to describe endogeneity. Since we construct
the potentially endogenous regressor from an observed variable not necessarily included in
the regression equation of interest, it is not the regressor itself that may be endogenous but
rather the variable from which we create it. Thus we can describe our equation of interest
as
Yij = Xijβ + Sijδ + ǫij, (8)
where Sij represents a network measure of the location of units i and j based on some
relational variable Rij. Note that we have moved to an explicitly dyadic context here since
these models generally focus on how two units’ relative locations affect a joint outcome
between them.
We introduce possible endogeneity through Rij,
Rij = Zijγ + ηij, (9)
by allowing for non-zero correlation in the joint distribution of the error terms:ǫij
ηij
 ∼ BV N

0
0
 ,
σ21 σ12
σ12 σ
2
2

 . (10)
Since a proof of bias caused by endogeneity would depend on the precise formula used to
12
calculate a particular network measure, Sij, (and may or may not exist depending on exactly
how such a measure is created) we leave that for studies of specific measures and provide
illustrations of potential bias in our Monte Carlo analysis. Of interest will be whether
differences across the formulas for the network measures lead to different amounts of bias
when the relational variable exhibits endogeneity. First, we outline two distinct approaches
to addressing the problem.
IV of the Network Score/Measure
Our first approach, which we hereafter refer to as the Instrumented Score approach, follows
the standard IV implementation in which we generate an instrument for Sij using a linear
regression model. Of course, since we calculate Sij from the relational variable Rij and the
possible endogeneity enters through the latter, we do not face the standard IV setup with two
linear equations. Rather, our possibly endogenous regressor depends in a nonlinear way on
the endogenous variableRij. We therefore turn to the work of Kelejian (1971) on the inclusion
of nonlinear functions of endogenous variables. Following its approach our Equation 8 may
be estimated consistently if we can find an instrument for Sij that is uncorrelated with ǫij
and linearly independent of Xij.
To generate the instrument, note that we can write the expectation of Sij as a function of
the fixed variables Zij and an unrelated random error. Kelejian (1971) then shows that even
though we may not know the exact form of this function we can approximate it with the
OLS prediction, Ŝij , that results from regressing Sij on a polynomial in Zij of degree d. For
large enough d, Zij and Ŝij are linearly independent, which results in consistent estimates.
Note that the elements of Zij may be identical to those of Xij as Kelejian (1971) assumes in
his exposition.
The unknown here involves picking a large enough d to insure independence of Xij and
the instrument. An additional complication in our setting arises from the fact that Ŝij often
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depends on the value of the exogenous variables, Z for units i and j but also on their values
for all other units. Most obviously, the calculation of the SEq score for just one pair ij
involves the values of Rkl for all other pairs kl. Thus the best linear approximation to Sij
may depend on polynomials of the values of Z for all units, which may undermine our ability
to generate a valid instrument through the IV equation as described above.
Instrumenting the Network
Our second approach, which we call the Instrumented Network approach for short, parallels
the standard IV solution but adds the extra step of generating the appropriate relational
measure from an instrument. Thus we estimate the regression model corresponding to Equa-
tion 9, generate predicted values R̂ij and construct the network score from these values, which
we refer to as Sij(R̂ij) ≡ Ŝij. We then substitute the instrumented relational score, Ŝij, into
our estimation of Equation 8:
Yij = Xijβ + Ŝijδ + ǫij. (11)
Two items warrant further discussion at this point. First, because we are using an
estimated instrument, our standard errors will tend to be too small. The usual solution
is either to estimate the two stages simultaneously or to correct the standard errors after
estimation. Given that the first solution is rather involved in the presence of a nonlinear
function of the instrumented variable, and also given that our goal is to develop a solution for
arbitrary network measures, we utilize a resampling approach. Specifically, we take draws
of the estimated distribution of R̂ij , calculate the resulting network measure Sij(R̂ij), and
average across the resulting estimates to obtain correct standard errors according to Little
and Rubin’s (2002) formula for multiply imputed data.10
10With m estimates of some quantity of interest, Q, denoted qˆ1, qˆ2, . . . , qˆm, the estimate of Q is just the
average q¯ = 1
m
∑m
i=1 qˆi while the variance is V ar(q¯) =
1
m
∑m
i=1 V ar(qˆi) +
m+1
m
(
1
m−1
∑m
i=1(qˆi − q¯)
2
)
(our
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Second, the nonlinearity of Sij(R̂ij) means that E[δ̂|Sij(R̂ij)] = δ may not hold. As
Kelejian (1971) proves, this approach will generally produce an inconsistent estimate of δ.11
Since our instrument removes the error terms in the relational equation and calculates the
network measure using the explained portion, we will effectively increase the correlation (and
therefore the network measure). Put differently, the correlation between two variables with
stochastic errors added is smaller than without it. This change in the scale of Sij will affect
the estimated coefficient.12 In the example just given, the estimate will be smaller than δ,
as this would allow the estimator to “preserve” the correct marginal effect of Sij. Possible
concerns about the effectiveness of the two alternate IV methods warrant a comparison,
which we present in the remainder of the manuscript.
Monte Carlo Analysis
In order to investigate the effects of endogeneity in variables used to create network measures,
we performed a Monte Carlo analysis using a data generation process designed to mimic what
one might find in a typical political science study. We start by generating information about
100 units. We then create a dyadic version of these data in order to generate relationship data
between these units. Next, we use this information to generate network measures based on
units’ relational data, as well as an outcome variable which depends on those relationships.
In order to investigate the effects of relational endogeneity, we introduce varying amounts of
correlation between the relational data and the outcome of interest.
notation here follows King et al. (2001)).
11For example, since SEq scores for i and j with a symmetric relational variable correspond to a correlation
between i and j’s relationship with each k, the estimated variance will be a function of variances i, j, and
their covariance. In the case of an asymmetrical variable, the true variance will take on an even more
complicated shape, due to asymmetries in i—k and k—i relationships.
12For example, when we have a symmetric relational variable the the SEq score reduces to a correlation and
we can derive the exact change in the scale of the variable that leads to a shift in the estimated coefficient.
One can account for this by appropriately rescaling the SEq score, as we do in our Monte Carlo
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Monte Carlo Setup
More formally, we start with a list of i = 1, 2, . . . , n units with characteristics captured by
variables Xi and Zi, both of which have a standard normal distribution. We then create a
dyadic data set consisting of all pairwise combinations of units, totaling 10,000 observations
from which we omit the same unit dyads, leading to a final sample size of 9900.
To generate interesting network scores, Sij, we place each country in a common space and
let the relational variable, Rij, depend on i and j’s relative location in this space. Specifically,
we evenly space each unit across a ten by ten grid and calculate the Euclidean distance, dij,
between the two units in each dyad. We then generate our relational variable based on the
unit-specific characteristics and distance:
Rij = Z1i + Z1j − dij + ηij, (12)
where the error terms are i.i.d. standard normal. Including distance in this equation makes
it so that units near each other will have common patterns in their values of Rij which will
create similarity among nearby pairs and dissimilarity among pairs that are further away.
To maintain comparability between variable scales, we normalize the standard deviation of
the distance variable to 1. We then use the observed outcomes for Rij to create our network
measure, Sij . Here we consider three such measures: centrality, S scores, and SEq as in
Equations 1, 2, and 5.
For each dyad we then calculate the outcome variable of interest as a linear regression
equation:
Yij = 0.25×X1i + 0.25×X1j + δ × Sij − 0.25× dij + ǫij . (13)
where X1k indicates the value of variable X1 for country k in the dyad, Sij represents the
network score for units i and j, and dij represents the Euclidean distance between the two
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states.13 The error term is generated from a standard normal. The coefficient on the network
score changes depending on which one we use since they each have different scales: for SEq
we set δ = −1, for S scores δ = −2.5, and for centrality δ = −0.2.
In order to ascertain the effects of endogeneity, we then introduce correlation between
the two error terms by drawing them from a bivariate normal distribution:ǫij
ηij
 ∼ BV N

0
0
 ,
σ21 σ12
σ12 σ
2
2

 . (14)
We set the variances equal to one which means that the covariance equals the correlation,
which we vary from -0.75 to 0.75 by increments of 0.25. For each value we generate 500
draws of the error terms, calculate the outcome, relational variable, and network measures,
and then estimate the coefficients in Equation 13 through linear regression. While we focus
here on a continuous outcome variable, note that similar results obtained for a dichotomous
variable representing a network tie estimated with an ERGM.
Finally, in order to correct for the possible endogeneity of Sij we consider both approaches
discussed above. First, we instrument the relational variable, Rij, by estimating Equation 12
via linear regression, calculating its predicted value, R̂ij , then constructing the network
measures using the instrument (e.g., Ŝij = SEq(R̂ij)) and using these instrumented scores
when we run the regression corresponding to Equation 13. We repeat this five times with
draws from the estimated distribution of R̂ij to capture the uncertainty in our instrument.
Second, we directly create an instrument of the score, Sij, by estimating a linear regression
that includes third order polynomials in Zi and Zj; a third order polynomial in the product
of Zi and Zj; and the products of distance with Zi, Zj, and ZiZj.
14 We hope to capture the
13Note that distance enters the estimation as an exogenous variable in both the relational and outcome
equations. Think, for example, of distance between states affecting both the dyadic trade and the probability
of conflict between them. We do this to explore the effect of correlation between the SEq score and another
variable in the outcome equation and this leads to bias seepage.
14We estimate this equation using ivregress in Stata, which adjusts the standard errors as part of the
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complex dependence of Sij on the exogeneous variables in the equation for Rij. Examining
the results for single draws indicated that adding these variables improved our ability to
predict Sij . For the the simulation using SEq scores we transform the score generated from
the instrumented network to put it on the same scale as the original variable.15
Monte Carlo Results
We present the results of our Monte Carlo analysis graphically in Figure 1. Tables with
more complete details are available in our supplemental appendix. The top plot shows the
average estimate and a 95% band around it (based on the standard deviation of the sampling
distribution) across the 500 draws for each value of ρ while the bottom plot shows the average
estimates of the coefficients for X1i and X1j . The latter show no bias whatsoever, which is
not surprising given that these variables have no correlation with the information in the SEq
score, so we focus our discussion on the coefficient for the SEq variable.
[Figure 1 here.]
The Monte Carlo results show clear evidence of bias for this variable. The line denoted
with circles represents the na¨ıve, or Uncorrected model, in which the network measures are
constructed using the observed relational variable, i.e., Sij(Rij). The na¨ıve model shows a
negative bias with a negative correlation between the error terms in the relational and out-
come equations and an upward bias with a positive correlation. The endogeneity appears to
create bias by increasing the relational variable while simultaneously increasing the outcome
of interest, Yij. That is, units appear to be more or less similar than they should be, based
on the sign of the correlation between the unobserved components of the relational and out-
estimation process.
15We construct this adjustment for each observation by dividing by the ratio of the expected value of the
denominator of the SEq score on the original relational variable to denominator of the SEq on the IV of
the relational variable. Since we use the variance of the error terms rather than the actual values this does
not reintroduce endogeneity into the variable. Without this correction, the approach that instruments the
relational variable and then constructs the network score showed some bias (as expected) but was preferred
on root mean squared error terms. These additional results are available from the authors on request.
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come variables. The extent of the apparent bias makes it so that the 95% interval does not
even include the true value for greater degrees of correlation. Note that a correlation of zero
breaks this dependence and results in an unbiased estimate.
The line denoted by triangles shows the results for the network measure calculated on
the Instrumented Network model, i.e., Sij(R̂ij). As noted above we adjusted this variable to
account for the difference in scale that results from our instrument compared to the observed
relational variable. This adjustment clearly works as the resulting average estimate sits quite
close to the true value. Finally, the line denoted by squares presents the results for the
Instrumented Score model using Ŝij. The model again estimates the true coefficient spot on,
although its confidence interval is noticeably larger than those for the two previous models.
These results therefore point to the Instrumented Network approach as superior on root
mean squared error terms.
Next, we evaluate the results for S scores, generated using the same procedure. Overall,
these results mirror those for the SEq score, but some differences emerge. The apparent bias
in the coefficient on the S score appears to be smaller in an absolute sense and also with
respect to the variation of the estimates. While the average estimate differs by as much as
twenty percent, the 95% central region of the sampling distribution always includes the true
value of 0.5. The results for the the Instrumented Network approach show no dependence on
the correlation, but deviate from the true value by a constant amount. We believe that this
result occurs due to a change in the variation of the underlying variables when calculated
using the instrumented rather than the observed relational variable. In this case a correction
is not as straightforward as it was for SEq. The Instrumented Score approach for S Scores is
again spot on the true value of the coefficient. Just as with the SEq estimate, the confidence
interval also appears only somewhat larger than that estimated by the Instrumented Score
model, although the difference is not that stark, and given the bias the Instrumented Score
approach outperforms the Instrumented Network approach in root mean squared error terms.
19
The last plot in the first row of Figure 1 presents the analogous results for an analysis
using centrality scores. The estimates of the Uncorrected model again exhibit a negative
bias for a negative error correlation and a positive bias for a positive error correlation, albeit
the 95% confidence interval does contain the true value. The estimates of both IV models,
in the meantime, are effective at correcting the bias and capturing the true values. Unlike
in the previous two applications, the confidence intervals produced by the two IV models
closely overlap, producing no clear winner in root mean squared error terms.
The bottom row of Figure 1 reports the estimates for the distance variable. This allows us
to determine whether the estimated coefficients for variables in both equations are affected
by endogeneity. In the case of the SEq measure, the plot supports our expectation by
showing deviations in the average estimate for the coefficient on distance in the Uncorrected
model. The apparent bias in the former represents about twenty percent of the true value
and the 95% confidence bands only overlap the true value when the correlation is near
zero. The Instrumented Network model seems to perform the best, providing an apparently
unbiased estimate of the true coefficient. The Instrumented Score approach captures the
true value of the coefficient, yet produces a larger confidence interval. The S score and
centrality applications reveal fewer noticeable difference among the three models, with both
the estimates and the confidence intervals nearly perfectly overlapping.
Overall, then, our Monte Carlo results show that endogeneity in relational variables used
to construct network-based or other relational measures can lead to bias in the estimated
coefficient on the network measure variable. This apparent bias increases with the absolute
value of the correlation between the error terms in the two equations. The deviations may
be sufficiently large to wash out the effect of the network measure or even to result in
incorrectly signed coefficients. Further, the endogeneity bias can also infect other variables
that appear in both equations (and we speculate that it would affect any variable in the
outcome equation correlated with variables in the relational equation). Either of two IV
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corrections we propose appears to eliminate endogeneity bias in the coefficient for variables
that appear in both equations, though changes in the scale of the underlying variable can
result in constant deviations from the true value as shown in the case of S Scores.
Empirical Applications
We demonstrate the advantages of the two-stage IV approaches to correcting endogeneity
in network measures with three empirical examples. The first two applications draw from
the study of conflict and trade. This relationship has been of perennial interest to scholars
with a great deal of attention recently to boundary conditions and endogeneity (e.g. Hegre,
Oneal and Russett 2010; Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny 2004; Lu and Thies 2010; Peterson and
Thies 2012; Reuveny and Kang 1996). The dominant argument in contemporary scholarship
holds that economic interdependence decreases conflict because conflict is associated with
increased investment risks, increased transaction costs, interruptions to the flow of infor-
mation, and otherwise leads to economic losses (Gartzke 2007; Russett and Oneal 2001).16
The reverse argument avers that, rather than trade reducing conflict, conflict reduces trade
due to the “primacy of politics” over economics. According to this argument, firms and
investors tend to “follow the flag” and are unwilling to do business in politically hostile
countries (Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny 2004). Multiple empirical tests of the trade-conflict
relationship, including simultaneous estimation, provide support for both arguments, sug-
gesting that the relationship is endogenous. We explore this endogenous relationship by
replicating Maoz et al. (2006), Cranmer and Desmarais (2011), and Long (2008). The first
two studies examine how trade structural equivalence scores affect conflict, while the third
includes alliance similarity when predicting bilateral trade flows.
Our third empirical application explores the relationship between states’ centrality within
the network of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and economic sanctions. While states
16For an overview of this literature, see Gartzke and Hewitt (2010), McDonald (2010), and Mueller (2010).
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with powerful positions within the PTA network may be more likely to issue economic
sanctions, position within the PTA network may be endogenous to the ability and willingness
to issue sanctions in the first place. To investigate this relationship, we conduct a replication
of Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2008), who make the former argument.
SEq Scores: Trade-Conflict Endogeneity
Our first empirical demonstration is based on recent work by Maoz et al. (2006), who have
imported the trade-conflict argument into a networks framework. Treating both inter-state
trade and conflict as networks with states representing nodes, Maoz et al. (2006) demon-
strate support for the pacifying effect of trade SEq, or structural equivalence within the
international trade network. The literature suggests, however, that trade and conflict may
be endogenous to each other, i.e., ongoing or anticipated conflict may reduce trade flows
(Keshk, Pollins and Reuveny 2004). This means that we may expect an error correlation
between trade—the relational variable used to construct SEq scores—and conflict—the de-
pendent variable. More formally, the error ηij in the relational covariate Trade (Rij) may be
correlated with the error ǫij in the dependent variable, Conflict (Yij).
In order to explore the advantages of the IV two-stage estimation, we use the two ap-
proaches discussed above to re-estimate Maoz et al. (2006) on a sample of all dyads between
1961-1996. In our analysis, we pay particular attention to the relationship between Trade
SEq and conflict.
The first approach—Instrumented Network—is to construct predicted values R̂ij for A-B
bilateral exports using a linear regression, and then use these predicted values instead of
the observed values of exports,Rij , to construct the Trade SEq variable, Ŝij, which we will
substitute into the outcome equation of conflict, Yij. The second approach—Instrumented
Score—is to construct an instrument of the Trade SEq score itself to subsequently use in
the outcome equation of conflict, Yij. Standard errors for the second stage of the model
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are obtained by repeating the following steps 5 times: re-sample the trade instrument from
its estimated distribution, recalculate the SEq scores, and estimate the model. We then
average the results according to Little and Rubin’s (2002) formula for multiply imputed
data as described previously.
Trade Instrument
The IV for exports between A and B is constructed based on the gravity model of trade
(Hegre 2009; Hegre, Oneal and Russett 2010). It includes the distance between the two
states, as well as their GDP and population. In addition to these components of the gravity
model, trade between two states may depend on each state’s resource endowment. States
rich in such highly desired resources as oil and natural gas, may have larger export volumes
of these commodities. The literature also suggests, however, that oil rich states may have
lower overall export volumes, as over-reliance on raw commodities may lead to a lack of
development in other sectors (Sachs and Warner 2001). The data on GDP and popula-
tion is obtained from the Expanded Trade and GDP data (Gleditsch 2002), while Resource
Endowment is measured as natural gas and oil endowment using data collected by Ross
(2011). Unfortunately, economic data often suffers from a large number of missing values
and imprecision, especially as one goes farther back temporally. In addition, resource data
is unavailable prior to 1961 and after 1996. Therefore, we limit our analysis to 1962-1996
(due to a one year lag). Finally, we log all variables to control for skewness. We add .001
to the trade variable in order to maintain as many observations as possible. Since every
observation is used to calculate the SEq scores, losing even a small number is problematic.
We report the results of the model used to create the trade instrument in our supplemental
appendix in Table 7. We use the predicted export values to construct the corrected Export
SEq scores to use in the second stage of estimation.17 In doing so, we closely follow Maoz
17The function that we wrote to calculate the SEq score replaces missing entries with zeros since missing
23
et al.’s (2006) procedure: we start by exponentiating the logged predicted values, then
reshape the dyadic data into an n × n matrix, whose ij cell entries represent the predicted
export values divided by GDP, and whose diagonal entries are defined as 1−
∑
limi 6=j
exportij
GDPi
.
Finally, we use the resulting matrix to calculate the Export SEq or Trade SEq, using the
formula in Equation (5).18
The Conflict Equation
The values of the dependent variable in the second stage—conflict—are coded as 1 if i and
j experienced a military interstate dispute (MID) in a given year, and 0 otherwise. The
estimation sample includes the total of 166 states between 1961-1996.
Following Maoz et al. (2006), in addition to Trade SEq, we regress the MID variable
on Distance, Capability Ratio, Minimum Regime Score, Alliance SEq, IGO SEq, and Peace
Years. For the exact replication, we also use the temporal splines included in the replica-
tion data. In all other models, we substitute splines with a linear, quadratic, and cubic
polynomials of time (Carter and Signorino 2010), as the manuscript does not include the
information on the knots chosen for the splines. Alliance SEq and IGO SEq are calculated
analogously to the Trade SEq variable, albeit without our correction for endogeneity.19 For
spatial considerations, we refer the reader to Maoz et al. (2006) for detailed information on
the coding and data sources for these variables.
even one element of a row or column makes the entire SEq calculation impossible.
18Note that our results are identical to the ones that would be obtained by substituting our predicted
values matrix into The Maoz Network Program. Despite closely following the procedure outlined in Maoz
et al (2006), we were only able to achieve a correlation of 0.6 between our replicated Trade SEq scores and
those contained in the replication files provided by the authors. We believe this disparity comes from the
differences in the samples used to construct the scores, i.e. SEq scores seem to be sensitive to such decisions
as whether to listwise delete the observations with missing data before or after constructing SEq scores. As
a result, the only way to produce the exact Trade SEq scores as the ones provided in Maoz et al’s (2006)
replication data is to calculate them on the exact same sample of countries as initially used by the authors.
This disparity, however, does not affect our ability to replicate Maoz et al’s (2006) results both in direction
and significance of the coefficients.
19We choose to ignore the possible endogeneity between Alliance SEq and IGO SEq, for the sake of isolating
the effect of correcting the endogeneity in the Trade SEq variable.
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Table 1 presents the results of our replications and analyses. Model 1 or Exact Replication
is a straight replication of Model 2 of Table 2 from Maoz et al. (2006)—the authors’ main
model of results.20 Model 2 or Na¨ıve Model presents our replication of the same model,
albeit restricted to the estimation sample from our IV equation (Table 7).21 Although the
dramatic decrease in sample size (and the associated loss in statistical power) results in
some differences in terms of statistical significance (on Distance and Alliance SEq), the
main inferences are unchanged. All of the statistically significant coefficients are signed in
the same direction as in Model 1.
Models 3 and 4 present the results of re-estimating the same model using the Instru-
mented Network and the Instrumented Score approaches, accordingly. Finally, given the
growing attention to network-oriented estimation approaches, such as ERGMs (for a de-
tailed description, see Cranmer and Desmarais 2011), we estimated models 5-7 using the
same specifications, but as an ERGM rather than a logistic regression. Both logistic regres-
sions and ERGMs produce a similar pattern of results: in both of the na¨ıve models, the
coefficient on Trade SEq is many times smaller in magnitude (and statistically insignificant
in the ERGM) than in the IV models.
[Table 1 here.]
This pattern of results becomes clearer in the view of the above Monte Carlo analysis.22
20Although we put our best effort in replicating the original models as closely as possible (we follow the
equation presented on p.679 of Maoz et al), there are several minor differences between our replication and
the original. First, while Maoz et al’s general analysis spans 1816-2000 (as indicated in the manuscript),
the authors do not explicitly note in the text that any models that include trade variables (including Model
2, which we replicate) are necessarily limited to 1870-1996, due to the data availability at the time of
publication. Hence, our straight replication is limited to 1870-1996, not 1816-2000. Second, there is a small
difference is sample size (N): while Maoz et al. Model 2 of Table 2 reports the N of 447,190, we obtained the
N of 448,022. Given the large time span and the number of countries, a difference of about 1000 observations
might have resulted from lagging a variable, treatment of outliers, or a number of other reasons. Third,
although our replication recovers the same coefficients in terms of statistical significant and direction, there
are several slight differences (in the second digit after the decimal point) in the actual recovered values.
21The availability of data for constructing the instrumental variables restricts our analysis to 1961-1996,
and we further restrict the upper bound to 1996, to make the sample more comparable to Maoz et al (2006).
22As our Monte Carlo analyses focus on simple regression models rather than ERGMs, so will our discussion
here. The ERGM results are presented as evidence that the issues raised here go beyond linear models and
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Specifically, the Monte Carlo analysis has demonstrated that there may be a divergence in
results between the na¨ıve and either of the IV models, in the presence of high endogeneity.
A high positive error correlation between the relational variable and the dependent variable
results in an upward bias in the coefficient on the SEq variable in the na¨ıve model. Analo-
gously, a high negative error correlation produces a downward bias. Both the IV models, in
the meantime, are virtually unbiased, although the Instrumented Network model typically
produces smaller standard errors.
Of course, the findings of the Monte Carlo analysis apply to “textbook-perfect” research
conditions that are rarely met when working with real empirical applications. Thus, for
example, unlike the results of the Monte Carlo, the models presented in Table 2 are not
fully comparable: Models 1, 2, and 4, use Trade SEq scores which are calculated from all
available trade data for the time period, while in Model 3 the calculation of Trade SEq is
limited to the estimation sample from the instrument model (Table 1). In light of the SEq
scores’ sensitivity to the treatment of missing values, which we uncovered in the course of
our analyses, the results in Model 3 are not directly comparable to Models 1, 2, and 4.23
With this in mind, the pattern of results presented in Table 1 could be tentatively ex-
plained by a high positive error correlation between trade and conflict.24 Such an error
correlation would cause attenuation bias on the Trade SEq coefficient in the na¨ıve model,
warrant further exploration in more complex estimation contexts.
23For example, Trade SEq scores calculated from the full sample of trade data available from the Correlates
of War Project (Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins 2009) are correlated with Trade SEq scores calculated from just
Model 2’s estimation sample at ρ = 0.56. Although exploring the effect of missing data on SEq is beyond the
scope of this paper, we suspect that this sample-driven difference suggests that missingness in the trade data
may be endogeneous to conflict (i.e. trade data is likely to be missing during wartime). If this is the case,
then it may be problematic to simply code missing observations as 0’s for the purposes of obtaining a square
matrix. For more on the issues of missing data in network analysis studies, see Cranmer and Desmarais
(2011).
24Although exploring the substantive nature of a positive correlation between trade and conflict is beyond
the scope of this paper, one should remember that Trade SEq is not a strictly dyadic measure, but rather
compares each state’s in the dyad trade with every other state in the system. Given this, a positive corre-
lation between trade and conflict could mean, for example, that when states A and B engage in a military
confrontation with each other, they also both increase their trade with many of the same states. Such a
pattern would arise, for example, if both of the disputants were buying weapons from the same exporter.
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while both of the IV models would recover the unbiased coefficient of larger absolute value.
The four models also exhibit some variation in statistical significance among the coef-
ficients on other variables. In particular, Alliance SEq is statistically insignificant in the
na¨ıve model, but becomes significant in the Instrumented Network model (though remains
insignificant in the ERGMs). Similarly, the coefficient on Distance, while statistically in-
significant in the na¨ıve model, becomes statistically significant in both the logit and ERGM
Instrumented Score models. For Alliance SEq, in particular, these inconsistencies could stem
from the endogeneity issue, analogous to that explored here using the example of Trade SEq :
the network of international alliances may not be independent of that of conflict.
The broad take-away point of the results presented in Table 1 is that the use of SEq
scores in the presence of high error correlation may result in substantive bias in the estimates.
The suggested IV models may help diagnose such error correlation and make the necessary
adjustments in the interpretation and use of the results.
S Scores: Alliance-Trade Endogeneity
Our second example draws on the work by Long (2008), who argues that bilateral trade
decreases in anticipation of conflict, as looming conflict is an indication of an upcoming
spike in the costs of transportation, transaction, and production. Long’s theoretical model
includes a set of additional covariates of bilateral trade, including the strength of diplomatic
ties. Arguing that states with good diplomatic relations may engage in greater levels of trade,
Long (2008) includes this effect in the empirical model, operationalizing diplomatic relations
as dyad-specific weighted S scores of alliance portfolios. A possible issue here is that state
A’s choice of trade partners may be nonindependent from its alliance commitments: relative
security concerns, for example, may dictate that states trade within rather than outside of
their security alliances (Gowa 1995). As a result, there may be an error correlation between
bilateral alliances—the variable used to construct S scores—and A-B bilateral trade—the
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dependent variable. We explore this issue by re-estimating the empirical analysis of Long
(2008) using the two IV approaches proposed above.
The first approach—Instrumented Network—is to construct predicted values R̂ij for A-B
bilateral alliance using a linear regression, and then use these predicted values instead of the
observed values of alliances, Rij, to construct weighted Alliance S Scores, Ŝij, which we will
plug into the outcome equation of trade, Yij. The second approach—Instrumented Score—is
to construct an instrument of the S score itself to subsequently use in the outcome equation
of trade, Yij.
Alliance Instrument
Along with most of the IR literature, Long (2008) obtains the data on weighted S scores from
the EUGene program (Bennett and Stam 2000). Generating predicted S scores to replicate
Long (2008), therefore, requires that we also follow the same procedure of calculating S scores
as the EUGene data. These S scores are based on the Alliance Type variable, obtained from
the Alliance Treaties Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset (Leeds et al. 2002) and
state Capability Index variable from the Correlates of War (COW) dataset (Singer 1987).
The Alliance Type variable is treated as an ordinal measure, with the value of 0 representing
the absence of an alliance, 1 representing an entente, 2— a neutrality pact, and 3—a defense
pact between states A and B in a given year (Signorino and Ritter 2002). Self-dyads of the
type i − i are commonly assigned the value of 3 (Sweeney and Keshk 2005), following the
logic that a state will defend itself if attacked (Bueno de Mesquita 1975).
To construct the instrument, we regress this variable on a set of covariates associated
with alliance formation, relying on the alliance formation equation from Long, Nordstrom
and Baek (2007). The results of the model used to create the instrument are presented in
Table 8 of our supplemental appendix. The model shows that stronger alliance commitments
are found between states of similar regime type as well as strategic rivals and states with a
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greater number of total allies. The strength of alliance commitments is negatively affected
by Distance, Major Power status and External Threat.
Next, we utilize the predicted values to generate the S score instrument using Equation 2.
Consistent with Long (2008), we weight predicted alliance portfolios by Side B material
capabilities, obtained from the Correlates of War (COW) dataset (Singer 1987). Despite the
difference, the raw and the corrected measures still have a rather high correlation of r = 0.45.
Mimicking Long (2008), we proceed to log our instrumented S scores before using them as
a regressor in the trade equation.25
Trade Equation
Next, we re-estimate Long (2008) using the author’s replication data. The side-by-side
results of the na¨ıve and the corrected models are presented in Table 2. Model 1 displays
the results of the na¨ıve model, Model 2 presents the results of the model, in which we first
create an instrument of Alliance, use this instrument to calculate the corrected S scores, and
substitute these S scores in the original equation. The third model (Instrumented S Score)
displays the results from a standard IV regression with S scores as the endogenous variable.
The side-by-side comparison of results reveals several indications of endogeneity and
associated bias in the na¨ıve model. First, note the difference between the coefficients on
the estimated and na¨ıve S score variable: insignificant in the na¨ıve model, this coefficient is
both significant and substantially larger in absolute value in both of the corrected models,
albeit the coefficient in the Instrumented Network model is the smallest in value (−13.197
compared to −1.94 in the Instrumented S Score model). Unlike the na¨ıve model, both of the
corrected models suggest some evidence of a negative relationship between alliance portfolio
similarity and trade.
25The correlation between the original S Scores variable used by Long (2008) and the S Scores variable
that we were able to construct by plugging in alliance data into the S Score formula from Equation 2 is 0.95.
The slight differences are likely due to updates in the alliance dataset and/or missing data.
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We can further explore these results, in the view of the findings from our Monte Carlo
analysis. In particular, the Monte Carlo analysis shows that the results of the na¨ıve model
may diverge from those of the two IV models in the presence of strong endogeneity between
the relational variable and the outcome variable. A strong positive error correlation leads
to a positive bias in the coefficient on S scores, while a strong negative correlation leads
to a negative bias. We also demonstrated that the Instrumented Network approach will
be characterized by downward bias in the S Score coefficient, while the Instrumented Score
approach will produce an unbiased estimate.
Judging from the patterns of results presented in Table 2, we may then suspect a positive
error correlation between alliance and trade, i.e., states that have a lot of over-lap in their
allies also engage in more trade. More broadly, the divergence in results between the three
models indicates endogeneity between the relational and the outcome variables. Just as with
the SEq scores, our recommendation is to explore rather than ignore the issue by estimating
both of the IV models we suggest. Such additional analyses will serve as a robustness check
for the main results and allow for uncovering possible endogeneity.
[Table 2 here.]
Centrality: PTA-Sanctions Endogeneity
Our final empirical application is a replication of Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2008),
who demonstrate that states with high centrality in the PTA network are most likely to
issue economic sanctions. In this example, we would like to draw attention to the possible
nonrandom formation of the PTA network and its possible endogeneity with respect to the
sanctioning behavior. Imposing economic sanctions is a form of conflictual behavior, albeit
of lower level that a military dispute. Conflictual behavior between two states may affect
their trade relationship, such as whether they sign a PTA. Just like with previous empirical
applications, we proceed in two stages. First, we use a set of regressors to predict whether
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two states are likely to be part of a PTA, which allows us to construct predicted values R̂ij for
the number of shared PTA memberships between pairs of states. We then use these predicted
values to construct PTA Centrality scores for each state in the system, which we proceed to
use instead of the “uncorrected” centrality scores in Hafner-Burton and Montgomery’s (2008)
model of economic sanctions. Second, we construct a direct instrument of PTA Centrality
itself, and use this in the outcome equation of economic sanctions.
PTA Instrument
Magee (2003)’s study of bilateral PTA agreement formation provides a great guide for iden-
tifying the necessary regressors for our PTA instrument. First, we include an indicator
variable of joint membership in the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or
World Trade Organization (WTO) in the previous year with the expectation that states
with joint GATT/WTO memberships are likely to have worked out additional bilateral
trade agreements whether simultaneously or as a result of their negotiations under GATT.
Second, it is important to account for the size of both parties, as we know that larger states
constitute more attractive trade partners, especially for states with smaller markets (Hegre,
Oneal and Russett 2010). We accomplish this by including lagged values of each state’s
logged GDP/capita, as well as a variable that equals to the logged difference between the
two states’ GDP/capita. As trade tends to decline with distance, we also include a variable
that measures the logged distance between the two states as well as an indicator variable,
Contiguity that captures whether the two states share a border.
Next, states might be more likely to enter in a PTA if they already share alliance ties.
We capture this by including an indicator variable, Allies that captures whether the two
states are part to an alliance. We may also suspect that states may be more likely to enter a
PTA if the majorities of their populations speak the same language. We control for this by
including a binary indicator Same Language. We also know that democratic states tend to
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engage in more trade than dyads made up of autocracies or mixed in terms of regime types
(Hegre, Oneal and Russett 2010). We account for this by including an indicator variable
that captures Joint Democracy. Two states may also be more likely to form a PTA if they
already view each other as major trade partners. We account for this by including a lagged
value of bilateral trade. Finally, the network of international PTAs has been shown to exhibit
the tendency towards triadic closure, i. e. states A and B are more likely to form a PTA
with each other if both A and B are already part to a PTA with the same state C (Manger,
Pickup and Snijders 2012). We account for this network dynamic by including a Triadic
Closure variable, coded as 1 if states A and B share an “indirect” PTA link by both sharing
at least one PTA with the same state C, and 0 otherwise.
The resulting model is presented in Table 9 of our supplemental appendix. Next, we
employ the predicted values to generate the centrality score instrument using Equation 1,
and substitute these scores in the original equation by Hafner-Burton and Montgomery
(2008).26
Economic Sanctions Model
The results are presented in Table 3: Model 1 presents the results of the straight replication,
while Models 2–4 present the na¨ıve and the two corrected models, using the sample from our
PTA instrument equation. The side-by-side comparison of results reveals several intriguing
differences between the na¨ıve model and the two instrumental variable approaches. The
coefficient on Centrality changes from 0.33 and statistically significant in the na¨ıve model to
statistically insignificant in the two models with corrections.
[Table 3 here.]
The great variation in the estimated effect of centrality is somewhat surprising in light
26The correlation between the original PTA Centrality variable used by Hafner-Burton and Montgomery
(2008) and the PTA Centrality variable that we were able to construct by plugging in the PTA data into
the centrality formula from Equation 1 is 0.91. The slight differences are likely due to the updates in the
PTA data or missing data.
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of the findings from our Monte Carlo analysis. There we saw little change in the estimates
for centrality across approaches, though we did see some modest bias using the uncorrected
centrality score in the direction of the correlation.
High error correlation or endogeneity, therefore, seems particularly likely to lead to a
Type I error (erroneously finding statistical significance), when the direction of the error
correlation (positive/negative) coincides with the hypothesized direction of the coefficient
on the offending variable. Uncorrected, a positive error correlation makes a positive coeffi-
cients appear greater than it actually is, while a negative error correlation makes negative
coefficients appear “more negative.” Both of the IV models, on the other hand, produce
virtually unbiased estimates. Here the coefficients from the IV approaches are signed in
opposite directions, but given that neither of them produces a significant finding perhaps
we should not read too much into that. It seems, however, that the relationship between
centrality and sanctions may need further exploration.
Conclusion
While network analysis specifically challenges the assumption of independence among indi-
vidual observations within the dataset, in practice many network approaches have not yet
been fully adapted to the use with political science data. In the view of growing attention
to network analysis within our discipline, surprisingly few studies have explored the inter-
play between the network tools and common political science data issues. In this paper, we
highlight and propose a solution to one such issue—endogeneity between network measures,
used as right-hand regressors, and the outcome variable.
While the issue of endogeneity is relevant to a wide array of empirical relationships, it
may become especially acute within the networks context, as endogeneity and the resulting
bias in the estimates may be further exacerbated, due to the nonlinear functional forms of
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many widely used network measures. As is the case with non-network approaches, possible
endogeneity, however, can be addressed by implementing either of two relatively straightfor-
ward adaptations of an IV two-stage estimation approach. We support our argument with
both Monte Carlo analyses and replications of several existing studies, which highlight the
substantial empirical consequences of ignoring bias.
Our current results point towards a number of future investigations. First, there is a
need for more research on the nature of the bias introduced by using raw or “uncorrected”
network scores. While our preliminary results suggest that there may not be a “one size fit
all” solution, and that various network-based or relational measures and scores might need to
be studied individually, we believe that the use of network measures has become sufficiently
ubiquitous to warrant such research. Second, as with any IV approach, the quality of our
estimates depends directly upon the quality of the instrument. Exploring how variation in
the ability of researchers to properly explain the relational variable should also be of interest.
This will more generally lead to a root mean squared error comparison of the instrumented
versus raw network measure. Third, an extension for discrete network connections would
be worth exploring. There is also a need for alternate approaches for network measures
that assume binary connections, in which case the continuously-measured instrument used
to calculate the measure might requiring weighting, such as that by the probability of a
connection. Finally, it would be helpful to explore the consequences of endogeneity through
additional Monte Carlo work. For instance, our results appear to show some bias for S scores,
but that bias also appears to be small relative to the precision of the estimates, especially
in comparison to the results for SEq scores. Whether this results from our particular setup
or suggests a general greater robustness of S scores is worthy of further investigation.
Note that we limited our analysis to exploring only the effects of correlation between
the error terms for each unit in the relational and outcome equations. Beyond that, we
assume independent and identically distributed errors in the two equations. In practice,
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many situations may certainly not meet this assumption; once we introduce correlation
between errors within equations, the effects of endogeneity could change dramatically, since
the network score calculation could then include many elements correlated with the outcome
of interest. Given the frequency of cross-sectional time-series applications of network scores,
exploring the possible consequences of autocorrelation in the relational measures could also
be worthwhile.
An obvious next step to account for these sorts of interdependencies would be to move
to a network-based estimation approach for modeling either the first or second stage in our
instrumented network approach. From a statistical point of view the consequences of endo-
geneity will tend to be the same; as noted above when we treated the second stage outcome
as dichotomous, undirected ties and estimated the resulting network as an ERGM, we saw
similar evidence of bias in the uncorrected approach, even when including common network
measures such as density, reciprocity and triads, but apparently unbiased estimated using
our instrumented network approach. One could also consider extending this to utilize an
ERGM for the relational variable. Still, in empirical applications, using an ERGM would
potentially help produce better estimates by accounting for other forms of network interde-
pendence. Latent space approaches could also work for either continuous or binary outcome
variables (Hoff, Raftery and Handcock 2002; Hoff and Ward 2004). If the networks that
connect units in the first and second stages share a similar structure, then ignoring them
would help contribute to endogeneity by inducing high degrees of correlation between the
error terms in the two equations. Even if this is not the case, applying either of these should
help provide more appropriate measures of uncertainty, which matters since our resampling
approach accounts for uncertainty in the first stage estimates. As our use of ERGMs in our
SEq replication shows, very different results can emerge compared to a simple logit model.
continuous or binary outcome variables (Hoff, Raftery and Handcock 2002; Hoff and Ward
2004). If the networks that connect units in the first and second stages share a similar
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structure, then ignoring them would help contribute to endogeneity by inducing high de-
grees of correlation between the error terms in the two equations. Even if this is not the
case, applying either of these should help provide more appropriate measures of uncertainty,
which matters since our resampling approach accounts for uncertainty in the first stage esti-
mates. As our use of ERGMs in our SEq replication shows, very different results can emerge
compared to a simple logit model.
Beyond the direct implications for network research, our results raise more general ques-
tions about the calculation of network-level measures in the presence of endogeneity. Be-
sides those examined here, other examples include measures of network polarity, economic
interdependence, or spatial-lag models. Since the endogeneity varies across actors, bias in
coefficients may be added or even multiplied in the process of calculation of such measures.
At a minimum, our results call for a further investigation of the effects of endogeneity on
these scores’ use as independent variables.
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Figure 1: Monte Carlo Results for Average Coefficient Estimates for Network Measures and
Distance Variable in the Equation of Interest, Varying Error Correlation
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Table 1: Exploring Endogeneity in SEq Scores. Replication and Extension of Maoz et al.
(2006). All Dyads
Logit ERGM
Exact Na¨ıve Instr. Instr. Na¨ıve Instr. Instr.
Replication Model Network SEq Replication Network SEq
Trade Equivalence (Maoz et al. 2006) −0.547∗∗∗ −0.762∗∗∗ −0.170
(0.091) (0.228) (0.392)
Trade Equivalence (Using Trade IV) −4.372∗∗∗ −3.024∗∗∗
(0.496) (0.941)
Trade Equivalence (Instrumented Score) −7.616∗∗∗ −5.084∗∗∗
(0.642) (1.396)
Minimum Regime Score −0.005∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Capability Ratio 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.000 −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.000 −0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Alliance Equivalence −0.354∗∗∗ −0.220 −0.502 ∗ ∗ −0.240 0.014 −0.119 0.025
(0.080) (0.188) (0.203) (0.203) (0.229) (0.251) (0.244)
IGO Equivalence 0.359∗∗∗ 4.725∗∗∗ 4.652∗∗∗ 4.401∗∗∗ 3.819∗∗∗ 3.874∗∗∗ 3.720∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.301) (0.305) (0.303) (0.576) (0.567) (0.584)
peaceyrs −0.404∗∗∗ −0.486∗∗∗ −0.491∗∗∗ −0.466∗∗∗ −0.572 −0.561 −0.551
(0.007) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.457) (0.457) (0.457)
Triads −2.774 −2.661 −2.743
(4.480) (4.468) (4.443)
Two Stars 0.522∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.078) (0.074)
Constant −2.260∗∗∗ −4.910∗∗∗ −3.411∗∗∗ −2.767∗∗∗ −4.585∗∗∗ −3.530∗∗∗ −3.102∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.321) (0.369) (0.377) (1.153) (1.016) (0.967)
N 448,022 154,570 154,570 154,570 154,570 154,570 154,570
Note: ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01.
Exact Replication re-estimates Model 2 of Table 2 (All Dyads, 1816-2000), using the replication data made available by Maoz
et al. (2006). All variables lagged one period. Sample size differences between Direct Replication and other models are due
to data availability on the variables used for constructing instrumental variables; they cover the period 1962-1996. Just like in
the original study, all independent variables are lagged one year. The correlation between the Trade SEq variable in the Na¨ıve
Model and Instr. Network Model is 0.31, while that between the Na¨ıve Model and Instr. SEq Model is 0.23. The Exact and
Na¨ıve employ the same Trade SEq variable. Variables capturing spline (Model 1) and cubic time trends (Models 2-6) included
but not reported.
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Table 2: The Issue of Endogeneity in S Scores. Replication and Extension of Long (2008)
Na¨ıve Model Instr. Network Instr. S Score
Year 1984-1997 1984-1997 1984-1997
Logged S Scores (Na¨ıve) −0.242†
(0.132)
Logged S Scores (Estimated) −13.294∗∗∗
(0.526)
Logged S Scores (Instrument) −1.194∗∗∗
(0.158)
Domestic Armed Conflict (it) −0.107∗∗∗ −0.078∗ −0.254∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.030)
Domestic Armed Conflict (jt) −0.081∗∗ −0.051 −0.334∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030)
Interstate Armed Conflict (it) −0.073∗∗ −0.070∗∗ −0.458∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.037)
Interstate Armed Conflict (jt) −0.025 −0.021 −0.340∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.037)
Interstate Armed Conflict (ijt) −1.164∗∗∗ −1.171∗∗∗ −3.428∗∗∗
(0.255) (0.254) (0.315)
Internal Conflict Risk (it) 0.439∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.887∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.060) (0.050)
Internal Conflict Risk (jt) 0.304∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.056) (0.050)
External Conflict Risk (it) 0.955∗∗∗ 1.035∗∗∗ 1.011∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.067) (0.050)
External Conflict Risk (jt) 0.689∗∗∗ 0.766∗ ∗ ∗ 0.479∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.063) (0.050)
Gross Domestic Product (it) 1.894∗∗∗ 1.874∗∗∗ 1.963∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.009)
Gross Domestic Product (jt) 1.534∗∗∗ 1.515∗∗∗ 1.577∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.009)
GDP/capita (it) −0.036 −0.111∗∗∗ −0.016
(0.024) (0.024) (0.012)
GDP/capita (jt) 0.074∗∗ −0.001 0.117∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.012)
Distance (ijt) −2.120∗∗∗ −2.649∗∗∗ −2.140∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.047) (0.022)
PTA (ijt) 0.430∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.033)
Border (ijt) 0.196 0.143 0.262∗∗
(0.134) (0.134) (0.082)
Joint Democracy (ijt) 0.409∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 1.077∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.033)
Allies (ijt) 1.025∗∗∗ 1.347∗∗∗ 1.192∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.095) (0.061)
Strategic Rival −2.411∗∗∗ −2.462∗∗∗ −2.842∗∗∗
(0.320) (0.320) (0.192)
Constant −25.332∗∗∗ −12.453∗∗∗ −27.175∗∗∗
(0.434) (0.694) (0.304)
N 217,340 217,340 217,340
R2 0.17 0.17 0.17
Note: †p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗∗ p<0.001
Na¨ıve Model is the exact replication of Long (2008) Table 1. The data was made available by the author. The
correlation between the Logged S Scores variable in the Na¨ıve Model and Instr. Network Model is 0.37, while that
between the Na¨ıve Model and Instr. S Score Model is 0.61. The Exact and Na¨ıve employ the same Logged S Scores
variable.
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Table 3: Endogeneity and Centrality Scores. Replication and Extension of Hafner-Burton
& Montgomery (2008)
Exact Na¨ıve Instr. PTA Instr.
Replication Model Network Centrality
Years 1947-2000 1947-2000 1947-2000 1947-2000
Centrality (Naive) 3.532∗∗∗
(0.657)
Centrality (Replication) 0.330∗∗
(0.127)
Centrality (Estimated) −0.355
(0.207)
Centrality (Instrument) 3.926
(2.186)
PTA membership 0.537 0.557 0.783∗∗ 0.498
(0.295) (0.289) (0.272) (0.291)
PTA*Trade (max(A,B)) −29.348 −24.116 −20.520 −20.397
(35.598) (35.425) (35.594) (37.663)
PTA*GDP A 0.032 0.031 0.007 0.029
(0.091) (0.090) (0.088) (0.089)
PTA*GDP B 0.089 −0.065 −0.206 −0.274
(0.586) (0.646) (0.695) (0.722)
PTA*Cluster Size 0.019∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.012∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
PTA*Same Cluster 0.286 0.220 0.167 0.311
(0.170) (0.172) (0.168) (0.178)
Polity A 0.125∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022)
Polity B −0.044∗∗ −0.046∗∗ −0.043∗∗ −0.050∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Trade (max(A,B)) −45.179∗ −42.654∗ −41.668∗ −49.407∗
(19.643) (19.407) (18.999) (21.289)
GDP A 0.691∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.044) (0.044)
GDP B 0.368∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.092) (0.094) (0.092)
Allies 1.143∗∗∗ 1.145∗∗∗ 1.055∗∗∗ 1.124∗∗∗
(0.233) (0.236) (0.233) (0.234)
constant −11.137∗∗∗ −10.874∗∗∗ −10.003∗∗∗ −10.684∗∗∗
(0.334) (0.348) (0.350) (0.370)
N 815,992 646,386 646,386 646,386
R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
Note: ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗∗ p<0.001
Exact Replication re-estimates Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2008) Model 1 of Table 1, using the
data provided by the authors. The differences in sample size between Exact Replication and other
models are due to missingness on the variables used to construct the instruments. The correlation
between the Centrality variable in the Na¨ıve Model and Instr. Network Model is 0.42, while that
between the Na¨ıve Model and Instr. S Score Model is 0.55. The Exact and Na¨ıve employ the same
Centrality variable.
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A Additional Monte Carlo Results
Table 4: Detailed Monte Carlo Results for Centrality
Estimate Standard Error Standard Deviation RMSE
ρ Naive Network Score Naive Network Score Naive Network Score Naive Network Score
Coefficient on X1 (true value = 0.25)
-.75 0.251 0.250 0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
-.5 0.250 0.249 0.249 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
-.25 0.250 0.249 0.249 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
0 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
.25 0.250 0.250 0.251 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
.5 0.249 0.250 0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
.75 0.249 0.249 0.249 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009
Coefficient on X2 (true value = 0.25)
-.75 0.251 0.251 0.251 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
-.5 0.251 0.251 0.251 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
-.25 0.251 0.251 0.251 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
0 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
.25 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
.5 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
.75 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
Coefficient on Centrality (true value = -0.2)
-.75 −0.206 −0.200 −0.200 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011
-.5 −0.204 −0.199 −0.199 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
-.25 −0.202 −0.200 −0.199 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
0 −0.200 −0.200 −0.200 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010
.25 −0.197 −0.199 −0.199 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
.5 −0.196 −0.200 −0.200 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.010
.75 −0.193 −0.200 −0.199 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.009 0.010
Coefficient on Distance (true value = -0.25)
-.75 −0.251 −0.250 −0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
-.5 −0.250 −0.250 −0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
-.25 −0.251 −0.250 −0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
0 −0.250 −0.250 −0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
.25 −0.250 −0.250 −0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
.5 −0.250 −0.250 −0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
.75 −0.249 −0.250 −0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.010
Notes. Results represent the averages from 500 simulations. Multiple imputation performed with 5 imputa-
tions.
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Table 5: Detailed Monte Carlo Results for Structural Equivalence
Estimate Standard Error Standard Deviation RMSE
ρ Naive Network Score Naive Network Score Naive Network Score Naive Network Score
Coefficient on X1 (true value = 0.25)
-.75 0.249 0.250 0.250 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
-.5 0.249 0.250 0.249 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
-.25 0.249 0.250 0.250 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
0 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
.25 0.249 0.249 0.249 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
.5 0.251 0.250 0.250 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
.75 0.251 0.249 0.250 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
Coefficient on X2 (true value = 0.25)
-.75 0.249 0.250 0.250 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
-.5 0.249 0.250 0.250 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
-.25 0.249 0.250 0.250 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
0 0.251 0.251 0.251 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
.25 0.250 0.249 0.250 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
.5 0.252 0.251 0.251 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
.75 0.251 0.249 0.249 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
Coefficient on SEq (true value = -1)
-.75 −1.736 −0.992 −1.046 0.125 0.150 0.347 0.128 0.170 0.345 0.747 0.170 0.348
-.5 −1.491 −0.984 −1.018 0.125 0.150 0.346 0.131 0.165 0.349 0.509 0.165 0.349
-.25 −1.245 −1.002 −1.005 0.125 0.150 0.347 0.129 0.164 0.340 0.277 0.164 0.340
0 −0.996 −0.993 −0.993 0.125 0.149 0.349 0.127 0.150 0.360 0.127 0.151 0.360
.25 −0.765 −1.008 −1.024 0.125 0.149 0.346 0.130 0.157 0.347 0.268 0.157 0.348
.5 −0.506 −0.995 −0.985 0.125 0.149 0.348 0.126 0.152 0.356 0.510 0.152 0.357
.75 −0.264 −0.999 −0.971 0.125 0.149 0.349 0.129 0.142 0.355 0.747 0.142 0.356
Coefficient on Distance (true value = -0.25)
-.75 −0.368 −0.247 −0.257 0.023 0.026 0.057 0.024 0.028 0.057 0.120 0.028 0.057
-.5 −0.329 −0.246 −0.253 0.023 0.026 0.056 0.024 0.028 0.057 0.082 0.028 0.057
-.25 −0.289 −0.249 −0.251 0.023 0.026 0.057 0.023 0.028 0.056 0.046 0.028 0.056
0 −0.249 −0.247 −0.249 0.023 0.026 0.057 0.022 0.026 0.059 0.022 0.026 0.059
.25 −0.212 −0.249 −0.254 0.023 0.026 0.056 0.024 0.028 0.057 0.045 0.028 0.058
.5 −0.171 −0.248 −0.248 0.023 0.026 0.057 0.023 0.027 0.059 0.083 0.027 0.059
.75 −0.132 −0.248 −0.245 0.023 0.026 0.057 0.024 0.026 0.057 0.121 0.026 0.058
Notes. Results represent the averages from 500 simulations. Multiple imputation performed with 5 imputa-
tions.
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Table 6: Detailed Monte Carlo Results for S Scores
Estimate Standard Error Standard Deviation RMSE
ρ Naive Network Score Naive Network Score Naive Network Score Naive Network Score
Coefficient on X1 (true value = 0.25)
-.75 0.251 0.250 0.251 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
-.5 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009
-.25 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
0 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
.25 0.249 0.249 0.249 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009
.5 0.250 0.249 0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
.75 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009
Coefficient on X2 (true value = 0.25)
-.75 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
-.5 0.250 0.249 0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009
-.25 0.249 0.249 0.249 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
0 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
.25 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
.5 0.249 0.249 0.249 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
.75 0.250 0.249 0.250 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009
Coefficient on S Score (true value = -2.5)
-.75 −2.635 −1.489 −2.492 0.136 0.084 0.155 0.129 0.102 0.147 0.186 1.017 0.147
-.5 −2.598 −1.490 −2.508 0.136 0.084 0.156 0.134 0.105 0.148 0.166 1.016 0.148
-.25 −2.545 −1.483 −2.501 0.137 0.084 0.156 0.145 0.110 0.159 0.152 1.023 0.159
0 −2.499 −1.485 −2.490 0.136 0.084 0.155 0.137 0.106 0.150 0.137 1.020 0.150
.25 −2.446 −1.481 −2.494 0.136 0.084 0.156 0.140 0.111 0.157 0.150 1.025 0.157
.5 −2.403 −1.480 −2.502 0.137 0.084 0.156 0.134 0.102 0.154 0.165 1.025 0.154
.75 −2.357 −1.491 −2.500 0.136 0.084 0.155 0.133 0.106 0.156 0.195 1.015 0.156
Coefficient on Distance (true value = -0.25)
-.75 −0.254 −0.247 −0.250 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
-.5 −0.253 −0.247 −0.251 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
-.25 −0.251 −0.246 −0.250 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.011
0 −0.250 −0.247 −0.250 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.011
.25 −0.249 −0.247 −0.250 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
.5 −0.247 −0.247 −0.250 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
.75 −0.245 −0.246 −0.249 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.011
Notes. Results represent the averages from 500 simulations. Multiple imputation performed with 5 imputa-
tions.
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Figure 2: Monte Carlo Results for Root Mean Squared Error for Network Measures in the
Equation of Interest, Varying Error Correlation
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Notes: Uncorrected models use the observed value of Rij to calculate the network score, Sij(Rij). Score of
instrumental variable models uses an estimate of Rij from a linear regression to generate Sij(R̂ij). Instru-
mental variable of score models runs an IV regression that models Sij(Rij) with a linear regression (see text
for details). Results based on 500 draws for each value of ρ. Confidence interval calculated using the standard
deviation of the sampling distribution of the coefficient estimates. True values indicated by darker red lines.
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B Estimates of IV First Stage Equations for Replications
Table 7: Instrumental Variable Estimates of Trade Network Formation (1961-1996)
Distance −0.950∗∗∗ (0.042)
GDP pc A 1.295∗∗∗ (0.054)
GDP pc B 1.110∗∗∗ (0.025)
Population A 0.800∗∗∗ (0.039)
Population B 0.739∗∗∗ (0.014)
Oil A −0.027 (0.200)
Oil B −0.058∗∗ (0.023)
Constant −25.941∗∗∗ (0.805)
N 428,725
R2 0.565
Note: ∗∗ p<0.05,∗∗∗ p<0.01
These results are estimated using an OLS. All variables
are logged.
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Table 8: Instrumental Variable Estimates of Alliance Network Formation (1984-1997)
Regime Similarity 0.186∗∗ (0.003)
Major Power (i) −0.032∗∗ (0.008)
Major Power (j) −0.038∗∗ (0.008)
External Conflict Risk (it) −0.014∗ (0.004)
External Conflict Risk (jt) −0.013∗ (0.004)
Distance (ijt) −0.382∗∗ (0.002)
Strategic Rivalry (ij) 0.142∗∗ (0.021)
Total Number of Allies (i) 0.011∗∗ (0.000)
Total Number of Allies (j) 0.011∗∗ (0.000)
Constant 3.021∗∗ (0.021)
N 217,340
R2 0.23
Note: ∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.001
These results are estimated using an OLS.
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Table 9: Instrumental Variable Estimates of PTA Network Formation (1947-2000)
Shared GATT membership 1.114∗∗∗ (0.013)
GDP/cap A −0.032∗∗∗ (0.005)
GDP/cap B −0.032∗∗∗ (0.005)
Allies 0.761∗∗∗ (0.074)
Joint Democracy 0.503∗∗∗ (0.030)
GDP A-GDP B −0.140∗∗∗ (0.007)
Distance, logged −0.282∗∗∗ (0.018)
Total Trade AB 0.128∗∗∗ (0.009)
Contiguity −1.471∗∗∗ (0.212)
Same Language −0.193∗∗∗ (0.045)
Triadic Closure 0.731∗∗∗ (0.012)
Constant 2.738∗∗∗ (0.141)
N 755,832
R2 0.22
Note: ∗∗∗p < 0.01
These results are estimated using an OLS.
Standard errors are clustered by dyad.
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